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SHOULD I STAY OR SHOULD I GO NOW:  FOREIGN LAW 
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE SUPREME COURT’S RECUSAL 
PROBLEM 
Christina Reichert* 
INTRODUCTION 
I . . . do solemnly swear . . . that I will administer justice without respect 
to persons, . . . and that I will faithfully and impartially discharge and per-
form all the duties incumbent upon me . . . under the Constitution and 
laws of the United States.1 
Every Supreme Court Justice must take this oath “before they may 
execute the duties of their appointed office.”2  But how is this impar-
tiality guaranteed?  The recusal process—where a litigant seeks the 
withdrawal of a Justice who may be perceived as biased or where a 
Justice removes him or herself from a case due to subjectivity—is one 
way the Court guarantees impartiality.  However, the United States 
recusal system is deeply flawed.3 
For example, many critics argued that Justice Antonin Scalia 
should not have participated in Cheney v. United States District Court be-
cause of his relationship to Vice President Dick Cheney—who was 
sued in his official capacity.4  The public scoffed when Justice Scalia 
went on a duck-hunting trip with Vice President Cheney just three 
weeks after the Court granted certiorari.5  More recently, Justice 
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 1 SUPREME COURT OF THE U. S., TEXT OF THE OATHS OF OFFICE FOR SUPREME COURT 
JUSTICES (2009), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/oath/
textoftheoathsofoffice2009.aspx (emphasis added). 
 2 Id. 
 3 See infra Part I. 
 4 Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 367, 374 (2004); see infra notes 94–99. 
 5 See Motion to Recuse at 4, Cheney, 542 U.S. 367 (No. 03-475), 2004 WL 3741418, at *4 
[hereinafter Motion to Recuse] (“[T]he nation’s editorial writers have called upon Jus-
tice Scalia to step aside in the interests of promoting the public confidence in the integri-
ty of the judicial process . . . .”) (citation omitted). 
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Elana Kagan chose to remain on National Federation of Independent 
Business v. Sebelius,6 even though she was the Solicitor General of the 
United States when Congress debated the Affordable Care Act 
(“ACA”) and when the office developed a litigation strategy for the 
Act’s constitutionality.7  On the same case, Justice Clarence Thomas 
did not recuse himself even though his wife is a verbal activist against 
the ACA and is a founder and lobbyist of the Tea Party group Liberty 
Central.8 
What is the effect of a Justice’s refusal to recuse, whether or not a 
litigant requested the Justice’s withdrawal?  Critics cite the Supreme 
Court recusal problem as a potential cause for the recent drop in the 
Court’s public opinion.9  As Or Bassok recently argued, the increased 
value of public confidence polls demonstrates that public opinion is 
the source of the current Court's legitimacy.10  Public confidence is 
also necessary to the proper functioning of our legal system, and the 
Court’s ratings are at an all-time low.11  The lack of public confidence 
in the Court leads to the public giving less weight and credibility to 
 
 6 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).  
 7 Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Justice and Appearance of Justice in Sherrilyn A. Ifill & Eric J. Segall, Judicial 
Recusal at the Court, 160 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 331, 335 (2012) (“Concerns about Jus-
tice Kagan’s impartiality arise largely from whether, as Solicitor General in the Obama 
Administration, she may have been involved in providing advice to members of the Ad-
ministration on the soundness or constitutionality of the health care law.”) 
 8 Mike Sacks, Clarence Thomas Petitioned By 100,000 Progressives To Recuse Himself From Health 
Care Cases, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 17, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/
02/17/clarence-thomas-petition-recuse-health-care_n_1284610.html.; see Ifill, supra note 
7, at 335. 
 9 See Adam Liptak & Allison Kopicki, Approval Rating for Justices Hits Just 44% in New Poll, 
N.Y. TIMES (June 7, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/08/us/politics/44-
percent-of-americans-approve-of-supreme-court-in-new-poll.html?pagewanted=all (ex-
plaining that the approval rating for the Justices is only forty-four percent, down from six-
ty-six percent in the 1980s and fifty percent in 2000, and that many Americans do not be-
lieve the Supreme Court judgments to be “impersonal”); The Supreme Court’s historically low 
approval ratings:  4 theories, THE WEEK (May 3, 2012), http://theweek.com/article/index/
227529/the-supreme-courts-historically-low-approval-ratings-4-theories (“The downward 
approval trend reflects the perception that the court is not longer a disinterested, apoliti-
cal protector of the Constitution . . . .”). 
 10 See generally Or Bassok, The Supreme Court’s New Source of Legitimacy, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 
153 (arguing that the Supreme Court’s basis for legitimacy has moved from knowledge to 
public opinion). 
 11 See Liptak & Kopicki, supra note 9 (explaining that the approval rating for the Justices is 
only forty-four percent, down from sixty-six percent in the 1980’s and fifty percent in 
2000); Luke McFarland, Is Anyone Listening?  The Duty to Sit Still Matters Because the Justices 
Say it Does, 24 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 677, 684 (2011) (“[P]ublic confidence in the judiciary 
is necessary to our judicial system.  Public trust in the Court, however, has declined to 
near all-time lows in recent decades.”); The Supreme Court’s historically low approval ratings:  
4 theories, supra note 9 (“The Supreme Court’s favorability rating is at a 25-year low . . . .”). 
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the decisions.12  Moreover, having a functioning system of recusal is 
necessary for maintaining the actual and perceived fairness of our le-
gal system.13 
Scholars have proposed a number of solutions to remedy the situ-
ation,14 and this Comment explores another remedy through a com-
parison of the U.S. system to that of foreign law systems of recusal.  
Foreign law is becoming increasingly important in U.S. law and can 
provide new perspectives and ideas on dealing with problems that ex-
ist across different countries’ judicial organizations.15 
By looking at the recusal systems of five foreign constitutional 
courts, this Comment evaluates the differences in the standards and 
procedures of each court and concludes that the U.S. Supreme Court 
should adopt one of two possible procedural changes:  (1) review the 
initial recusal motion as a court, without the Justice whose recusal is 
requested or (2) allow for an appeal to the Court sitting without the 
Justice whose recusal is requested. 
Part I describes the problems of the American legal system of 
recusal, including a description of constitutional and statutory re-
quirements and the applicable procedure and standards.  Part II in-
cludes an overview of proposed solutions to the United States recusal 
problem.  Part III discusses the recusal systems for two common law 
countries’ constitutional courts, including the Supreme Court for the 
United Kingdom and the High Court of Australia.  Part IV discusses 
the recusal systems of three civil law countries, including France, 
Germany, and Japan.  Part V analyzes the wisdom that we can derive 
 
 12 See R. Matthew Pearson, Duck Duck Recuse?  Foreign Common Law Guidance & Improving 
Recusal of Supreme Court Justices, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1799, 1805 (2005) (“Because the 
judiciary derives authority from the public’s belief in the reasoned foundation of its deci-
sions, and because decisions stained with apparent bias undermine that belief, justice 
must not only be done but manifestly must be seen to be done.” (citation omitted)). 
 13 Id. at 1805 (“Mandatory and discretionary recusal of judges enhances the image of judi-
cial fairness and promotes public confidence in the judicial process.”). 
 14 See infra Part II. 
 15 See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 977 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[W]e 
are interpreting our own Constitution, not those of other nations, and there may be rele-
vant political and structural differences between their systems and our own.  But their ex-
perience may nonetheless cast an empirical light on the consequences of different solu-
tions to a common legal problem . . . .” (citation omitted)); Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t 
PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 403 (2000) (Breyer, J., concurring) (considering decisions of the Eu-
ropean Court of Human Rights and the Canadian Supreme Court); Raines v. Byrd, 521 
U.S. 811, 828 (1997) (discussing the constitutional practices of several European courts, 
including those in France and West Germany); Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 906 n.14 
(1994) (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing numerous foreign voting systems); United States 
v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 710 (1987) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part) (citing the Nuremberg Military Tribunals for support). 
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from these five foreign courts.  Part VI describes this Paper’s pro-
posed solution and evaluates any potential limitations for applying 
the solution to the United States Supreme Court. 
I.  RECUSAL IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
This Part provides an overview of the Supreme Court’s recusal sys-
tem, beginning with the historical approach to the withdrawal of Jus-
tices.  A description of the recusal procedure is offered next.  Then, 
this Part explains the legal restrictions placed on a Justice when s/he 
decides a recusal motion, followed by an overview of the standard de-
veloped through case law.  Subsequently, this Part describes the Jus-
tices’ “duty to sit,” which comes from outside of traditional legal ex-
planations for recusal motion denials. 
A.  A Brief History of the Recusal Problem 
From the very beginning of the Court, Justices have pushed the 
limits of what impartiality requires.  For instance, Chief Justice John 
Marshall wrote the opinion in Marbury v. Madison,16 one of the 
Court’s most famous decisions, which established the Court’s judicial 
review power.  But was he impartial?  The cause of action arose when 
then-Secretary of State James Madison refused to deliver William 
Marbury’s commission as Justice of the Peace of the District of Co-
lumbia.17  However, Chief Justice Marshall preceded Madison as Sec-
retary of State and it was Justice Marshall, in his role as Secretary of 
State, who failed to deliver Marbury’s commission in a timely man-
ner.18  Further, the Court decided the case in the midst of a political 
war between the Federalists and the Republicans, a war to which 
Chief Justice Marshall was a party.19  Chief Justice Marshall was deeply 
imbedded in Marbury’s cause of action and with the political battle 
raging in the United States.20  Should he have recused himself?  Did 
 
 16 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
 17 Id. at 137–38. 
 18 Sanford Levinson & Jack M. Balkin, What Are the Facts of Marbury v. Madison, 20 CONST. 
COMMENT. 255, 260 (2003) (“Marshall was the Secretary of State whose failure to deliver 
Marbury’s commission in a timely fashion in the first place gave rise to the litigation in 
Marbury.”). 
 19 Id. at 257–58.  Marshall was appointed as Chief Justice for the same reason the Midnight 
Judges Act was passed—in order to fill the Judiciary with Federalist judges.  Id. at 258.  
The controversy surrounding the case showed that Marshall was inextricably a part of it, 
and it is curious that Marshall did not recuse himself from a case in which he was clearly 
involved. 
 20 Id. at 257–58. 
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he consider recusing himself?  Unfortunately, we do not know be-
cause he offered no explanation. 
This early example of unexplained non-recusal set the stage for 
the subsequent denials of recusal by other Supreme Court Justices.  
But there are also examples where a Justice disqualified himself or 
herself for reasons that seem less problematic than Chief Justice Mar-
shall’s involvement in Marbury.  Even Chief Justice Marshall recused 
himself from Stuart v. Laird21 because he sat as the circuit judge and 
delivered the lower court opinion in the case.22  However, at this time 
in history, a Justice often reviewed the decision that s/he made while 
riding circuit.23  Marshall, again, provided explanation neither for de-
ciding to recuse himself in Stuart nor refusing to disqualify himself in 
Marbury, and we are left asking what actually drove these choices.  
This kind of unexplained and inconsistent decision-making is com-
mon with recusal jurisprudence. 
In rare cases, a Justice has provided an explanation for his or her 
disqualification or decision not to recuse.  For example, in Public Util-
ities Commission of D.C. v. Pollack,24 Justice Felix Frankfurter recused 
himself because he believed that he would be unable to decide the 
case fairly, based on his strong beliefs about the cause of action.25  
The case dealt with public buses playing the radio, and Frankfurter 
stated that as a “victim of the practice in controversy,” he could not 
participate in the case.26 
Compared to Chief Justice Marshall’s role in Marbury, Justice 
Frankfurter’s position as a member of the public who was forced to 
listen to the radio on public buses is far less connected to the case 
and controversy.  Yet, we have one Justice who recused himself be-
cause he personally experienced radio playing on a bus and another 
who did not recuse himself, even though he actually signed the 
commission that was at the center of the controversy.  The dichotomy 
of these decisions provides an example of the problem of Supreme 
Court recusal.  A Justice makes his or her decisions, generally without 
disclosing why or how, and the parties must accept it.27  From the 
 
 21 Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299 (1803). 
 22 Id. at 308 (reporter’s note); Levinson & Balkin, supra note 18, at 260. 
 23 Levinson & Balkin, supra note 18, at 260. 
 24 Pub. Utils. Comm’n of D.C. v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 (1952). 
 25 Id. at 467 (statement of Frankfurter, J.) (“My feelings are so strongly engaged as a victim 
of the practice in controversy that I had better not participate in judicial judgment upon 
it.”). 
 26 Id. 
 27 See infra Part I.B; see generally Suzanne Levy, Why Congress Can and Should Require Justices to 
Publish Reasons for their Recusal Decisions, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. (forthcoming March 2014) 
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point of view of an outsider observer, the decisions of particular Jus-
tices deciding whether to recuse themselves may seem inconsistent.  
Justices have refused to recuse themselves in cases that would seem to 
strongly limit their ability to be impartial28 and Justices have recused 
themselves in cases where their ability to be impartial does not seem 
to be significantly affected29 
Currently, the debate continues over when a Justice should recu-
se.  Justices continue to decide whether to recuse in inconsistent cir-
cumstances, coming to decisions that make the American public 
scratch their head.  Moreover, critics cite the Supreme Court’s 
recusal problem as a possible reason for the recent drop in the public 
opinion of the Court.30  And, the press ferociously covers31 recusal re-
fusals in controversial cases, creating debates and casting doubt on 
the Court’s impartiality and, potentially, the Court’s legitimacy.32 
B.  The Recusal Procedural Process 
One of the primary concerns about motions for recusal is that the 
Justice in question decides whether to recuse, providing no appeal 
from this decision.  Supreme Court Rule Twenty-One governs the 
recusal procedure of the Court.33  An application is filed with the 
Clerk of the Court, who transmits the motion to the particular Jus-
tice.34  The Justice decides the motion and files a response.35  There is 
 
(arguing that Justices should be required to release their reasons for denying recusal mo-
tions). 
 28 See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
 29 Pollak, 343 U.S. at 466 (discussing Justice Frankfurter’s recusal). 
 30 Cf. The Supreme Court’s historically low approval ratings, supra note 9 (discussing that the 
court has been seen as “increasingly politicized”); Liptak & Kopicki, supra note 9 (describ-
ing how few Americans believe Supreme Court judgments to be “impersonal”). 
 31 See Dan Collins, Scalia-Cheney Trip Raises Eyebrows, CBS NEWS (Dec. 15, 2003, 10:19 AM), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/scalia-cheney-trip-raises-eyebrows/ (“[S]everal experts in 
legal ethics questioned the timing of their trip and said it raised doubts about Scalia’s 
ability to judge the case impartially . . . .”); Stephen Dinan, Health case raises recusal ques-
tions for Kagan, Thomas, WASH. TIMES (Nov. 14, 2011), http://www.washingtontimes.com/
news/2011/nov/14/court-announcement-raises-recusal-questions-kagan-/?page=all (“Be-
fore the Supreme Court case is heard, we need to know if Justice Elena Kagan helped the 
Obama administration prepare its defense for Obamacare when she was solicitor gen-
eral.”); Press Release, Judicial Watch (Mar. 22, 2012), in Judicial Watch Asks Supreme Court 
Justice Elena Kagan to Directly Address Obamacare Recusal Controversy, REUTERS (Mar. 22, 
2012, 5:24 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/22/idUS227341+22-Mar-
2012+MW20120322 (describing how a national government watchdog group asked Jus-
tice Kagan to articulate her reasoning behind any decision regarding recusal in Sebelius). 
 32 See generally Bassok, supra note 10 (discussing the court’s decreasing distance from public 
opinion and the questions of legitimacy that are starting to result). 
 33 SUP. CT. R. 21. 
 34 Id. 
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no requirement for an opinion to accompany the response to a mo-
tion for recusal.36  Most responses are less than a sentence, simply stat-
ing “[m]otion to recuse, presented to [the] Justice . . . , is by him [or 
her] denied.”37 
In almost every other area of the law, decisions are made by an en-
tity with little or no self-interest in the outcome.38  However, a Justice 
has the sole authority to decide whether s/he will recuse.  A Justice 
must take a hard look at his or her own circumstances and the public 
perception of these circumstances, and ask whether a reasonable per-
son would think the Justice in question is biased.  It is difficult to look 
at one’s own possible conflicts of interest from an outsider’s point of 
view, and even harder to believe that anyone could perceive bias 
based on that.39  Further, it is almost insulting to be accused of poten-
tial partiality, particularly where it would be a contested issue.  Thus, 
because of the “appearance of partiality and the perils of self-serving 
statutory interpretation . . . another [Justice] should preside over 
such motions.”40 
This is particularly poignant because in the Supreme Court, there 
is no appellate review of recusal denials.  There is no check on a Jus-
tice's decision that a reasonable person could not apprehend that the 
Justice is biased, particularly because that decision is based on the 
Justice's interpretation of his or her own partiality. 
 
 35 Id. 
 36 Id. 
 37 See, e.g., Ernest v. U.S. Attorney, 474 U.S. 1016, 1016 (1985) (“Motion to recuse Justice 
Powell denied.”); Kerpelman v. Attorney Grievance Comm’n of Md., 450 U.S. 970, 970 
(1981) (“Motion to recuse The Chief Justice denied.”); Gravel v. United States, 409 U.S. 
902, 902 (1972) (“Motion to recuse, presented to Mr. Justice Rehnquist, by him de-
nied.”); Guy v. United States, 409 U.S. 896, 896 (1972) (“Motion to recuse presented to 
Mr. Justice Blackmun and Mr. Justice Rehnquist by them severally denied.”); Serzysko v. 
Chase Manhattan Bank, 409 U.S. 1029, 1029 (1972) (“Motion to recuse Mr. Justice Powell 
and Mr. Justice Rehnquist denied.”). 
 38 See Jeffrey M. Hayes, To Recuse or to Refuse:  Self-Judging and the Reasonable Person Problem, 33 
J. LEGAL PROF. 85, 96–97 (2008) (“A number of other commentators have noted the im-
propriety of allowing judges to consider motions to recuse directed at their own partiali-
ty.”); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Rehnquist, Recusal, and Reform, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 589, 667 (1987) 
(“In virtually every area of the law, decisions are made ultimately by an entity with little or 
no self-interest in the outcome of the decision.”). 
 39 See generally Joyce Ehrlinger et al., Peering into the Bias Blind Spot:  People’s Assessments of Bias 
in Themselves and Others, 31 PERSONALITY SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 680 (2005) (explaining that 
people tend to believe that their own judgments are less prone to bias than those of oth-
ers); Emily Pronin & Matthew B. Kugler, Valuing Thoughts, Ignoring Behavior:  The Introspec-
tion Illusion as a Source of the Bias Blind Spot, 43 J. EXP. SOC. PSYCHOL. 565 (2007) (describ-
ing the existence of a “bias blind spot” in people when they assess bias in themselves). 
40     Leslie W. Abramson, Deciding Recusal Motions:  Who Judges the Judges?, 28 VAL. U. L. REV. 543, 
561 (1994). 
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The procedural problem of the Court’s recusal system is not the 
end of the issue either.  If the recusal standard, provided by statutes, 
was clear and easily applied, then the weakness in the procedure may 
be overlooked.  However, as this Comment shows, the recusal stand-
ard, as it has developed from recusal statutes, is just as problematic as 
the procedure. 
C.  The Statutory Landscape Underlying American Recusal 
1.  Judicial Disqualification Statute:  28 U.S.C. § 455 
In the time of Marbury, no clear statutory rule existed to guide a 
Justice in his or her recusal decision.  Now, a statute directly applies 
to a Justice’s decision on recusal.41  Congress intended the law to pro-
vide a statutory ground to disqualify a judge or Justice based on the 
canons of the Judicial Code of Conduct.42  The first section states that 
a Justice must “disqualify himself [or herself] in any proceeding in 
which his [or her] impartiality might reasonably be questioned.”43  
The second section, § 455(b), provides specific circumstances where 
a Justice must disqualify him or herself.44  These include 
 
(1) Where he [or she] has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a par-
ty, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the 
proceeding; (2) Where in private practice he [or she] served as lawyer in 
the matter in controversy, or a lawyer with whom he [or she] previously 
practiced law served during such association as a lawyer concerning the 
matter, or the judge or such lawyer has been a material witness concern-
ing it; (3) Where he [or she] has served in governmental employment 
and in such capacity participated as counsel, adviser or material witness 
concerning the proceeding or expressed an opinion concerning the mer-
its of the particular case in controversy; (4) He [or she] knows that 
he[ or she] . . . or his [or her] spouse or minor child residing in his [or 
her] household, has a financial interest in the subject matter in contro-
versy . . . ;[and] (5) He [or she] or his [or her] spouse, or a person with-
in the third degree of relationship . . . : (i) Is a party to the proceed-
ing . . . ; (ii) Is acting as a lawyer in the proceeding; (iii) Is known by the 
judge to have an interest that could be substantially affected by the out-
come of the proceeding; [or] (iv) Is to the judge’s knowledge likely to be 
a material witness in the proceeding.45 
 
 
 41 H.R. REP. NO. 93-1453, at 1–2 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6351, 6351–52. 
 42 Id. 
 43 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (2006). 
 44 28 U.S.C. § 455(b) (2006). 
 45 Id. 
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From the plain language and structure of 28 U.S.C. § 455, it is ap-
parent that the first section applies to a more general apprehension 
of bias for any particular reason, whereas the second section requires 
disqualification of a Justice in situations where Congress has decided 
a Justice’s partiality is per se in question.  While it appears that § 455 
provides for protection against favoritism by demanding recusal when 
a Justice’s “impartiality might reasonably be questioned,”46 this Com-
ment illustrates that the interpretation and application of this statute 
tends to move closer to requiring a showing of actual bias.47 
Moreover, the presence of 28 U.S.C. § 455 has not remedied the 
problem.  For example, in Microsoft Corporation v. United States,48 Chief 
Justice William Rehnquist decided to remain on the case even though 
his son was a partner for the law firm representing Microsoft and was 
one of the lawyers representing Microsoft in related matters.49 
Chief Justice Rehnquist stated that § 455(b)(5)(iii) would not dis-
qualify him because his son’s interests “[would not] be substantially 
affected by the proceedings currently before the Supreme Court.”50  
He based this conclusion on the fact that Microsoft would be paying 
his son’s firm on an hourly basis and that the outcome of the case 
would not affect that payment.51 
Next, he argued that § 455(a) did not require his recusal because 
his “son’s personal and financial concerns [would] not be affected” 
by the case and, therefore, no “appearance of impropriety ex-
ist[ed].”52  However, Chief Justice Rehnquist accepted that the dispo-
sition of the case could have had “a significant effect on Microsoft’s 
exposure to . . . suits in other courts,”53 which could have affected his 
son’s representation of Microsoft.  But he stated this was a weak basis 
for recusal because it would have made the standard over-inclusive.  
Chief Justice Rehnquist argued that this could not be a sufficient ba-
sis for recusal because “[e]ven [the Court’s] most unremarkable deci-
sion . . . might have a significant impact on the clients of [the Justic-
es’] children who practice law.”54 
 
 46 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (2006). 
 47 See infra Part II. 
 48 Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 530 U.S. 1301 (2000). 
 49 Id. at 1301 (statement of Rehnquist, C.J.). 
 50 Id. at 1302. 
 51 Id. 
 52 Id. 
 53 Id. 
 54 Id. at 1303. 
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2.  Ethics in Government Act 
The Ethics in Government Act55 requires high-salaried govern-
ment employees to file annual financial reports.56  It also gives the At-
torney General the power to investigate and bring a civil action 
against individuals who the Attorney General has reasonable cause to 
believe have willfully failed to file required information.57  This statute 
makes material available that displays the potential financial conflicts 
of a Justice.  And the threat of investigation and civil action appears 
to weigh against the hiding of judicial conflicts of interest. 
After watchdog groups brought to light Justice Clarence Thomas’s 
failure to disclose information that could have been evidence of bias 
in Sebelius, Justice Thomas acknowledged that he erred in not disclos-
ing certain financial facts, including his wife’s past employment. 
However, there was no civil action commenced by the Attorney Gen-
eral.58  The statute has teeth, in theory, but in practice, the Attorney 
General may be unwilling to bring a civil action against a Justice.  
While pressure from the media led to Justice Thomas amending his 
financial disclosure to include his wife’s income from her conserva-
tive political work, there was no enforcement action from the Execu-
tive branch.59 
Professor Deborah L. Rhode stated that this harmed Justice 
Thomas’s reputation.60  But what about the effect it had on the 
Court’s reputation?  Common Cause, a liberal advocacy group, wrote 
a letter to James C. Duff, Secretary to the Judicial Conference of the 
United States, stating, 
Common Cause respectfully requests that the Judicial Conference make 
such a determination in the case of Justice Thomas . . . .  Without disclo-
sure, the public and litigants appearing before the Court do not have ad-
equate information to assess potential conflicts of interest, and disclosure 
is needed to promote the public’s interest in open, honest and account-
able government.61 
 
 55 Ethics in Government Act of 1978, 5 U.S.C. App. 4 § 101 (2006). 
 56 Id. 
 57 See id. at § 104 (“The Attorney General may bring a civil action . . . against any individual 
who knowingly and willfully falsifies or who knowingly and willfully fails to file or report 
any information that such individual is required to report . . . .”). 
 58 See Eric Lichtblau, Thomas Cites Failure to Disclose Wife’s Job, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 24, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/25/us/politics/25thomas.html?_r=1&. 
 59 See id. (discussing how Justice Thomas’s failure to disclose his wife’s past employment was 
a conflict for which there is no formal mechanism for review, even from the executive 
branch). 
 60 Id. 
 61 Letter from Bob Edgar, President and CEO and Arn H. Pearson, Vice President for Pro-
grams, Common Cause, to James C. Duff, Sec’y to the Judicial Conference of the U.S. 
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Justice Thomas stated that he “inadvertently omitted” this infor-
mation due to a “misunderstanding.”62  Representative of New York 
Louise Slaughter argued for further investigation because “[t]o ac-
cept Justice Thomas’s explanation without doing the required due 
diligence would be irresponsible.”63  In the wake of this controversy, 
legislators questioned “whether Justice Clarence Thomas can impar-
tially rule on the pending challenges to the federal heal-care [sic] 
overhaul”64 and asked him to recuse himself.65  This type of controver-
sy over propriety and impartiality affects the perception of the Court 
as an impartial body. 
3.  Guidance from Other Sources 
There are also non-binding guidelines that a Justice uses to decide 
whether to recuse.  One of the most prominent sources of judicial 
ethics is the Judicial Code of Conduct.66  The Judicial Conference of 
the United States, which includes the Chief Justice of the Supreme 
Court, produces the Judicial Code of Conduct.67  This Code is bind-
ing for all federal judges, but not for Supreme Court Justices.68 
The Code of Conduct focuses on five canons: 
(1) A Judge Should Uphold the Integrity and Independence of the Judi-
ciary; (2) A Judge Should Avoid Impropriety and the Appearance of Im-
propriety in All Activities; (3) A Judge Should Perform the Duties of the 
Office Fairly, Impartially, and Diligently; (4) A Judge May Engage in Extra-
 
(Jan. 21, 2011), available at http://www.commoncause.org/site/apps/nlnet/
content2.aspx?c= dkLNK1MQIwG&b=4773617&ct=11515523. 
 62 Lichtblau, supra note 58 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 63 Jennifer Bendery, Clarence Thomas Should Be Investigated For Nondisclosure, Democratic Law-
makers Say, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 29, 2011, 7:12 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost. 
com/2011/09/29/democratic-lawmakers-call-for-investigation-into-clarence-thomas-
finances_n_987934.html. 
 64 Nathan Koppel, Democratic Legislators Call for Investigation of Justice Thomas, WALL ST. J. L. 
BLOG (Sept. 30, 2011 5:00 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2011/09/30/democratic-
legislators-call-for-investigation-of-justice-thomas. 
 65 Id.; Letter from Anthony D. Weiner, House Representative, U.S. Cong., to Justice Thom-
as, in Conflicted Clarence Thomas, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 10, 2011 01:08 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/rep-anthony-weiner/conflicted-clarence-
thoma_b_821444.html. 
 66 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES, availa-
ble at http://www.uscourts.gov/RulesAndPolicies/CodesOfConduct.aspx (last visited Jan. 
3, 2013) [hereinafter CODE OF CONDUCT]. 
 67 See Rules and Policies, UNITED STATES COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/RulesAndPolicies. 
aspx (last visited Jan. 3, 2013). 
 68 See CODE OF CONDUCT, supra note 66 (“This Code applies to United States circuit judges, 
district judges, Court of International Trade judges, Court of Federal Claims judges, 
bankruptcy judges, and magistrate judges.”). 
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judicial Activities That Are Consistent with the Obligations of Judicial Of-
fice[; and] (5) A Judge Should Refrain from Political Activity.69 
Under canon three, we find language very similar to 28 U.S.C. § 
455(a), stating that a judge should disqualify him or herself where 
his/her impartiality “might reasonably be questioned.”70 
In his 2011 Year End Report, Chief Justice John Roberts stated 
that while the Code of Conduct applies only to lower federal court 
judges, the Supreme Court is not exempt from observing the same 
ethical principles.71  Moreover, Justice Roberts declared that many 
Justices look to the Code of Conduct for advice when making recusal 
decisions because the Code plays the same role as guidance for both 
Justices and other judges.72 
While Chief Justice Roberts and Professor Russell Wheeler argue 
that the Code of Conduct does not create palpable penalties for low-
er court judges, Professor Amanda Frost contends that there are tan-
gible results for the misconduct of judges.73  Frost maintains that the 
Code of Conduct is more than guidance for other federal judges be-
cause their actions in contravention of the Code can provide a basis 
for a misconduct ruling.74  Basically, because a misconduct proceed-
ing can follow a violation of the Code, the Code provides more than 
an informational role.75 
In addition to the Code of Conduct, a Justice relies on the advice 
of his or her fellow Justices and various experts in ethics to guide a 
 
 69 Id. (emphasis added). 
 70 Id. at Canon 3(C)(1). 
 71 John Roberts, 2011 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary 3–4, SUPREME COURT OF THE 
U.S. 3-4 (2011), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/year-
endreports.aspx (noting that the Code of Conduct plays the same role for Justices as it 
does for other federal judges because, according to the commentary accompanying Can-
non 1, it is “designed to provide guidance to judges”). 
 72 Id. at 7–9; see also Russell Wheeler, What’s So Hard About Regulating Supreme Court Justices’ 
Ethics?—A Lot, BROOKINGS INST. (Nov. 28, 2011), http://www.brookings.edu/research/
papers/2011/11/28-courts-wheeler (referring to Justice Kennedy’s statement during a 
House appropriations subcommittee hearing that the Code of Conduct applies to the Jus-
tices in the sense that they have agreed to be bound by them by resolution). 
 73 See Roberts, supra note 71, at 5 (“[T]he Court has had no reason to adopt the Code of 
Conduct as its definitive source of ethical guidance.”); Wheeler, supra note 72 (citing the 
Coference’s Codes of Conduct Committee chair that the Code is “advisory and aspira-
tional”); Amanda Frost, Regulating the Supreme Court Justices’ Ethics:  a Response to Russell 
Wheeler, AM. CONSTITUTION SOC. BLOG (Mar. 25, 2011), http://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/
regulating-the-supreme-court-justices-ethics-a-response-to-russell-wheeler (stating that a 
violation of the Code of Conduct can form a basis for a finding of statutory misconduct). 
 74 Frost, supra note 73 (arguing that lower court judges are obliged to follow the Code of 
Conduct or risk “investigation and sanctions”). 
 75 Id. 
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recusal decision.76  This, like the Code of Conduct, is not a concrete 
rule.  A Justice is able to ask advice of his or her fellow Justices, but is 
not required to.  Chief Justice Roberts wrote that the Justices often 
turn to “judicial opinions, treatises, scholarly articles, . . . disciplinary 
decisions[,] . . . [and] advice from the Court’s Legal Office, from the 
Judicial Conference’s Committee on Codes of Conduct, and from 
their colleagues.”77  But, this happens behind closed doors, and the 
public is unaware when a Justice uses these sources to make his or her 
decision. 
Additional bases for recusal standards are statements from the 
Court itself.  For example, the Court released a statement in 1993 de-
scribing its standard for recusal in situations where a family mem-
ber—the Justice’s spouse or a person within the third degree of rela-
tionship to either the Justice or the Justice’s spouse78—participated in 
a case.79  The Justices wrote that they would not recuse if a family 
member participated in a case, unless the relative was the lead coun-
sel, absent a special factor that the relative would be affected by the 
proceeding.80 
Therefore, while not binding or required, there are a number of 
other sources of ethical guidelines for Justices.  Unfortunately, the 
additional guidelines only serve to muddy the already unclear guide-
lines for the Court.  What is required is a clearly defined and uni-
formly applied standard. 
D.  The Recusal Standard:  Reasonable Apprehension of Bias 
Because 28 U.S.C. §455 requires a Justice to recuse where there is 
a reasonable apprehension of bias, the Court applies an objective 
standard.81  The standard is that a Justice should be disqualified “if an 
objective observer would entertain reasonable questions about the 
[Justice]’s impartiality.”82  The standard asks what a reasonable per-
 
 76 Roberts, supra note 71, at 5 (explaining that the Justices may seek advice from their col-
leagues). 
 77 Id. 
 78 28 U.S.C. §455 (b)(5) (2006). 
 79 SUPREME COURT OF THE U.S., STATEMENT OF RECUSAL POLICY (1993), 
http://www.eppc.org/docLib/20110106_RecusalPolicy23.pdf [hereinafter  STATEMENT 
OF RECUSAL POLICY]. 
 80 Id.; McFarland, supra note 11, at 683–84. 
 81 28 U.S.C. §455(a) (2006) (“Any justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the United States 
shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be 
questioned.”). 
 82 Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 564 (1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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son would think, not a reasonable Justice.83  In tort law, a reasonable 
person is one who “exercise[s] those qualities of attention, 
knowledge, intelligence, and judgment which society requires of its 
members for the protection of their own interests and the interests of 
others.”84  The standard should not take into account the special cir-
cumstances of an individual—for example, the judicial characteristics 
of a Justice.85  Adopting the viewpoint of such an ideal person may 
lead to the imputation of specific qualities that are above-and-beyond 
those of a reasonable person.86 
At the circuit court level, there are different interpretations of 
how this standard should be applied.  In the Fourth Circuit, a judge’s 
perspective should not be used because of his or her awareness of the 
obligation of a judge to be impartial.87  The reasonable observer is 
“not the judge himself [or herself] or a judicial colleague but a per-
son outside the judicial system.”88  In addition, in the First Circuit, the 
reasonable person is one who has the mind of an objective knowl-
edgeable member of the public.89 
In the Fifth and Seventh Circuits, the reasonable person must be 
from outside of the legal profession because an outsider is less likely 
to give credit to a judge’s impartiality and mental discipline.90  How-
ever, Professor Pearson argues that in these circuits, applying an out-
sider perspective does not necessarily remove deference to a judge 
because a "reasonable person is not 'hypersensitive or unduly suspi-
cious.'"91 
 
 83 Id. 
 84 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §283 cmt. b (1965). 
 85 Id. at cmt. c (“The standard which the community demands must be an objective and ex-
ternal one, rather than that of the individual judgment, good or bad, of the particular in-
dividual.”); Hayes, supra note 38, at 97–98 (explaining the use of a “reasonable person 
standard”). 
 86 See Hayes, supra note 38, at 99–100 (noting that if subjective views are used to determine 
what is reasonable, the supposed objectivity of the reasonable person collapses into sub-
jectivity). 
 87 Pearson, supra note 12, at 1812 (citing to the Fourth Circuit’s consideration of the rea-
sonable observer in United States v. DeTemple, 162 F.3d 279, 287 (4th Cir. 1998)). 
 88 DeTemple, 162 F.3d at 287. 
 89 In re United States, 666 F.2d 690, 695 (1st Cir. 1981); Pearson, supra note 12, at 1813. 
 90 See United States v. Jordan, 49 F.3d 152, 156–57 (5th Cir. 1995) (“Judges must ascertain 
how a reasonable person would react to the facts.  Problematic is the fact that judges do 
not stand outside of the judicial system . . . .”);  see also In re Mason, 916 F.2d 384, 386 (7th 
Cir. 1990) (stating, also, that “the judge does not stand outside the system”); Pearson, su-
pra note 12, at 1813 (explaining how, in the Fifth Circuit, the “reasonable person stand-
ard” has been likened to “the viewpoint of an average person on the street”) (citing 
Potashnick v. Port City Constr. Co., 609 F.2d 1101, 1111 (5th Cir. 1980)). 
 91 Pearson, supra note 12, at 1812 (citing In re Mason, 916 F.2d 384, 386 (7th Cir. 1990)). 
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For the Supreme Court, there is limited precedent providing an 
understanding of how a Justice applies the standard to him or herself 
because most Justices do not write statements explaining their recusal 
decisions.  In the statements that exist, a Justice seeks to apply the 
reasonable person standard from the point of view of the informed 
observer.92  But in practice, the standard collapses into that of the Jus-
tice’s point of view.93 
For example, in Cheney v. United States District Court, Justice Scalia’s 
memorandum explains why he refused to recuse himself from the 
case.94  After the Court granted the writ of certiorari, Justice Scalia 
went on a duck hunting vacation, where he flew on Air Force Two 
with Vice President Cheney.95  The public outcry96 at Justice Scalia’s 
apparent partiality led the Sierra Club to file a motion requesting that 
the Justice recuse himself.  The Sierra Club argued that the “unani-
mous conclusion” of the American public that there was an appear-
ance of favoritism demonstrated that an objective observer would 
 
 92 See Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 541 U.S. 913, 924 (2004) (Scalia, J. mem.) (noting that a 
reasonableness standard applies to the decision of a judge’s impartiality). 
 93 See Hayes, supra note 38, at 101 (“The combination of self-judging and the reasonable 
person standard, however, proves unworkable in practice by failing to adequately con-
strain judicial discretion.”). 
 94 Cheney, 541 U.S. at 914–29. 
 95 See id. at 915 (detailing the Justice’s trip with Vice President Cheney); Hayes, supra note 
38, at 101 (using Justice Scalia’s recusal memorandum in Cheney as a case study); Motion 
to Recuse, supra note 5, at 2 (noting that Justice Scalia’s trip had been described in nu-
merous media reports). 
 96 See, e.g., Justice Scalia and Mr. Cheney, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 28, 2004), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/02/28/opinion/justice-scalia-and-mr-cheney.html (call-
ing for Justice Scalia to recuse himself from the case); Dahlia Lithwick, Sitting Ducks:  Ruf-
fled feathers over the Supreme Court’s recusal rules, SLATE (Feb. 3, 2004, 6:52 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2004/02/sitting_
ducks. html (noting the pressure by watchdog groups on Justice Scalia to recuse himself); 
Bill Mears, Watchdog groups question Cheney, Scalia hunting trip, CNN (Jan. 19, 2004, 6:04 
PM), http://cnn.com/2004/ALLPOLITICS/01/19/scotus. cheney. scalia/index. html 
(noting that it may be up to the other Justices to put enough pressure on Justice Scalia to 
recuse himself); Warren Richey, Was the duck hunt a conflict of interest?, CHRISTIAN SCI. 
MONITOR (Feb. 13, 2004), http://www.csmonitor.com/2004/0213/p02s01-usju. html 
(noting that several academics were concerned over Justice Scalia’s trip with Vice Presi-
dent Cheney); David G. Savage & Richard A. Serrano, Scalia Was Cheney Hunt Trip Guest; 
Ethics Concern Grows, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 5, 2004), http://articles.latimes.com/2004/feb/
05/nation/na-ducks5 (detailing the duck hunting trip and noting the ethical gap in the 
Supreme Court’s review of recusal decisions); Scalia and Cheney’s outing:  No ordinary duck 
hunt, ASSOCIATED PRESS, in USA TODAY (Feb. 6, 2004), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/
news/washington/2004-02-06-cheney-scalia_x.htm (noting that because Vice President 
Cheney had a significant personal and political interest in the litigation, Justice Scalia 
should recuse himself). 
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conclude that Justice Scalia was partial towards Vice President Chen-
ey.97 
Justice Scalia concluded that the standard requires the objective 
observer to have knowledge of the actual facts and circumstances.98  
Therefore, he claimed that because the editorials were inaccurate 
and uninformed, the American public could not represent the objec-
tive observer.99  Moreover, he stated that he does not believe that his 
“impartiality can reasonably be questioned.”100  However, the sole in-
dividual who has knowledge of all of the surrounding facts and cir-
cumstances is the Justice who is deciding the motion.101  Justice Scalia 
may have been moving the objective observer point of view closer to 
that of the individual Justice—in this case, himself. 
In Microsoft Corporation v. United States, Chief Justice Rehnquist sim-
ilarly denied a motion to recuse himself from a case where his son 
was a partner in a firm representing Microsoft in a related matter.102  
He also argued that a potential impact on the Microsoft litigation was 
not enough to show a reasonable apprehension of bias because of the 
broad impact that any Court decision may have on a Justice’s rela-
tives.103  Chief Justice Rehnquist imputed knowledge of this fact to the 
reasonable person,104 which, again, seems to move the standard closer 
to the point of view of the Justice.  The Justices, in applying the objec-
tive observer standard, have a strong tendency to migrate the point of 
reference from that of a reasonable, outside viewer to that of a Su-
preme Court Justice.105  This both undermines the statutory require-
ments—a reasonable basis, not actual bias—and upsets the public—
 
 97 See Motion to Recuse, supra note 5, at 3–4 (noting that newspaper editorials indicate a 
unanimous public conclusion of favoritism). 
 98 See Cheney, 541 U.S. at 924 (“It is well established that the recusal inquiry must be ‘made 
from the perspective of a reasonable observer who is informed of all the surrounding 
facts and circumstances.’”(internal citation omitted)). 
 99 See id. at 923–24 (addressing the inaccuracies in the editorials attached to the Sierra 
Club’s motion). 
100 Id. at 926 (emphasis added). 
101 See Hayes, supra note 38, at 101 (noting that judges get to use their unique knowledge of 
the facts to apply the reasonable person standard to themselves). 
102 Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 530 U.S. 1301, 1301 (2000) (statement of Rehnquist, 
C.J.) (noting that his son worked for the firm Microsoft had hired on retainer for a dif-
ferent matter). 
103 See id. at 1303 (“Even our most unremarkable decision interpreting an obscure federal 
regulation might have a significant impact on the client of our children who practice 
law.”). 
104 See id. (noting that an observer informed of the broad effect Supreme Court decisions 
have would not conclude partiality toward Microsoft). 
105 See Hayes, supra note 38, at 101 (noting that judicial discretion on the issue of recusal is 
unconstrained when it involves self-judging). 
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who may be confused about why a Justice who appears biased can say 
that there is no reasonable apprehension of bias. 
E.  The “Duty to Sit” 
Another wrinkle present in the Justice’s mind when dealing with 
the decision to recuse is the “duty to sit.”  Scholars have described the 
“duty to sit” as a presumption against recusal, particularly where the 
reasons for not recusing are as strong as the reasons for recusing.106  
The concept developed from English common law and is not codi-
fied in statute or displayed in rules of ethics.107 
It appears that Congress attempted to replace the “duty to sit” 
with a presumption for disqualification when it passed 28 U.S.C. § 
455.108  In the statute, Congress created an objective standard with a 
requirement for a Justice to disqualify himself or herself not only if 
there is actual bias present, but also when a Justice’s impartiality might 
reasonably be questioned.109 
However, a Justice is inclined to use the “duty to sit” concept be-
cause if s/he recuses, then there is no one to replace him or her.110  
The concept provides a basis for Chief Justice Rehnquist’s statement 
that depriving the Court of a Justice “creates a risk of affirmance of a 
lower court decision by an equally divided court.”111  Further, Justice 
Scalia revived the concept when he refused to withdraw from Cheney 
by stating that “granting [a recusal] motion is . . . effectively the same 
as casting a vote against the petitioner.”112  Therefore, the “duty to sit” 
is still present in the minds of Justices when they make recusal deci-
sions, even if it is not part of any statutory, ethical, or Constitutional 
standard. 
 
106 See Stempel, supra note 38, at 595; McFarland, supra note 11, at 681. 
107 See McFarland, supra note 11, at 680–81 (relaying the history behind judicial recusals). 
108 See H.R. REP. NO. 93-1453, at 5 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6351, 6354–55 (not-
ing that the language of the statute would have the “effect of removing the . . . duty to 
sit”). 
109 See id. (“Disqualification for lack of impartiality must have a reasonable basis.”). 
110 See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, Discussion at the University 
of Connecticut School of Law (Mar. 12, 2004), in An Open Discussion with Ruth Bader Gins-
burg, 36 CONN. L. REV. 1033, 1039 (2004) (noting the risk that a case will be left undecid-
ed if a Justice is forced to recuse himself or herself from the bench). 
111 Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 530 U.S. 1301, 1303 (2000). 
112 Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 541 U.S. 913, 916 (2004) (Scalia, J. mem.). 
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II.  PROPOSED SOLUTIONS 
In light of these issues, many scholars and politicians have sug-
gested ways to improve the recusal system as it applies to the Supreme 
Court.  This Part discusses the proposals and demonstrates their indi-
vidual flaws.  First, this Part analyzes the proposal to allow sitting or 
retired judges and Justices to hear recusal appeals.  Next, this Part 
breaks down the suggestion addressing the “duty to sit” which would 
permit retired Justices to replace recused Justices.  Finally, this Part 
considers the proposition that the Court adopt formal standards gov-
erning recusal.  As this Comment suggests, all three of these pro-
posals are deeply flawed. 
A.  Meaningful Review 
Representative Chris Murphy of Connecticut introduced a bill 
that would have created a court of sitting or retired judges or Justices 
to decide how recusal motion denials should be reviewed and to hear 
appeals from unsuccessful recusal motions.113 
The Justices argued that this would violate the “one Supreme 
Court” mandate of Article III § 1 of the Constitution, which states, 
“[J]udicial power . . . shall be vested in one supreme Court.”114  The 
Justices stated that establishing an appeals panel to review Court deci-
sions would create, in essence, a court above the Supreme Court.115  
They distilled this principle from Justice Charles Hughes’s advisory 
opinion on the Court-packing plans of President Franklin Roose-
velt.116  In the letter, Justice Hughes suggested that the President’s 
plan to divide and enlarge the Court ran counter to Article III §1.117 
 
113 See H.R. 862, 112th Cong. (2011); see also Wheeler, supra note 72 (critiquing the bill as 
unconstitutional, in violation of the “one Supreme Court” mandate). 
114 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (emphasis added); see also Wheeler, supra note 72 (noting that a 
court of lower court judges would most likely violate the Constitution). 
115 See Wheeler, supra note 72 (noting that the appeals process in place for lower judges seek-
ing recusal does not apply to the Supreme Court because there is no higher court). 
116 See Paul A. Freund, Charles Evan Hughes as Chief Justice, 81 HARV. L. REV. 4, 28 (1967) (not-
ing that Justice Hughes’ letter argued against President Roosevelt’s assurance that addi-
tional appointments would prove more efficient); Alpheus Thomas Mason, Charles Evans 
Hughes:  An Appeal to the Bar of History, 6 VAND. L. REV. 1, 11 (1952) (“[Chief Justice 
Hughes’] letter suggests that the President’s idea of an enlarged Court and the hearing of 
cases in divisions might run counter to the Constitutional provision for ‘one Supreme 
Court.’”); Wheeler, supra note 72 (discussing Chief Justice Hughes’s challenge to Presi-
dent Roosevelt’s 1937 proposal). 
117 See Freund, supra note 116, at 28 (“The Chief Justice observed that to sit in divisions 
would not only be inadvisable but would seem to contravene the provision in Article III 
that there shall be ‘one Supreme Court.’”); Mason, supra note 116, at 11 (noting that the 
President’s idea of enlarging the court was contrary to the Constitution). 
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However, Professor Amanda Frost argues that there is no need to 
entertain the “one Supreme Court” argument.118  Frost maintains that 
the proposed statute would allow a committee of judges and retired 
Justices to decide that the entire Court must review a Justice’s deci-
sion not to recuse.119  In this situation, there is no need for the com-
mittee to become a separate “court” above the Supreme Court.120  In-
stead, the committee would make it possible for the Court, as a 
whole, to review the recusal decision of a single Justice. 
Some scholars have argued that there is no constitutional bar to 
the full Court hearing appeals from denied recusal motions.121  They 
contend that nothing in the text of the Constitution, in Article III or 
elsewhere, limits Congress’s power to require the Court to review a 
Justice’s ability to decide on a case.122  These scholars also state that 
this is a mild infringement on the Court’s power, as “compared to 
other Congressional attempts to influence the Court.”123 
Therefore, the constitutionality of this bill is still unclear.  Either 
way, the issue is moot because the bill was not passed. 
B.  Remedying the “Duty to Sit” 
Senator Patrick Leahy proposed a bill to allow retired Justices to 
sit on the Court by designation when a Justice recuses himself or her-
self.124 
There are practical issues in applying this solution.  First, there is 
the possibility of Justice shopping.  Litigants could survey the charac-
teristics of the retired Justices who agree to participate in this pro-
gram and determine that it would be beneficial to their case if a re-
 
118 Frost, supra note 73 (arguing that the problem with the recusal process is that a Justice 
acts alone, rather than consulting the entire Court). 
119 Id. (“The bill gives the Judicial Conference discretion to decide which judges or justices 
(including retired Justices) could review a single justice’s refusal to recuse him or her-
self.”). 
120 See id. (noting that, by requiring only current Supreme Court Justices to review recusal 
decisions, the bill would not be creating a court higher than the Supreme Court). 
121 McFarland, supra note 11, at 688 (discussing academics who argue that review of recusal 
decisions can be done constitutionally). 
122 Id. (“Furthermore, nothing in the text of Article III or any other provision of the Consti-
tution prohibits Congress from requiring the Court to review the qualifications of Justices 
to participate in individual cases.”) (citing Stempel, supra, note 38, at 656–57). 
123 McFarland, supra note 11, at 688. 
124 S. 3871, 111th Cong. (2010); see also Press Release, Senator Patrick Leahy, United States 
Senator for Vt., Leahy Proposes Bill to Allow Retired Justices to Sit on Court by Designa-
tion (Sept. 29, 2010), available at http://www.leahy.senate.gov/press/leahy-proposes-bill-
to-allow-retired-justices-to-sit-on-court-by-designation (addressing Senator Leahy’s reasons 
for proposing the legislation). 
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tired Justice sat on the case.  Then, the party could file a recusal mo-
tion, if a reasonable apprehension of bias exists against a Justice who 
is likely to decide against them.  This would result in litigants affect-
ing both the composition of the Court and the outcome of a case. 
While choosing the retired Justices at random could remedy Jus-
tice shopping, it would most likely not fix this problem.  For example, 
let us assume that the litigant would prefer a more liberal Justice.  If 
all participating retired Justices are more liberal than the disqualified 
conservative Justice, then it would not matter which randomly select-
ed retired Justice sits on the case.  In this instance, the litigant engag-
es in Justice shopping by disqualifying a sitting Justice based on his or 
her ideology in order to replace him or her with any of the preferred 
retired Justices. 
C.  Formalized Standards 
The Justices could also accept a formal standard for deciding 
recusal motions in a number of ways.  First, they may accept the Code 
of Conduct as binding.125  Because the Justices already say they follow 
the Code and the rules are not overly burdensome, this seems a sim-
ple solution meant to quell public upset.126  Further, the formal dis-
qualification rules already apply to Justices via 28 U.S.C. § 455(a).127 
Second, the Justices could create their own formal rules and fol-
low them.  They already created a standard with their 1993 Statement 
on family members involved in litigation.128  This option would in-
crease transparency and provide the public with the comfort that the 
Court is following formal ethical guidelines, of which the public 
would be aware.  If the Court itself adopted and enforced these ethi-
cal guidelines, then there appears to be no constitutional issue.  
Nothing in Article III limits the Court’s power to adopt its own pro-
 
125 See generally Supreme Court Justices and the Code of Conduct, AM. JUDICATURE SOC. (Aug. 22, 
2011), www.ajs.org/judicature-journal/editorial/supreme-court-justices-and-the-code-of-
conduct/ (discussing the possibility of explicitly adopting the Code that the Supreme 
Court Justices already implicitly follow). 
126 See id. (“By explicitly adopting the Code of Conduct for U.S. Judges they already implicitly 
follow, U.S. Supreme Court justices will demonstrate that they understand the connection 
between their conduct and public confidence and distance themselves from the conten-
tions that they take their ethical responsibilities lightly.”). 
127 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (2006) (stating that the disqualification rules apply to any justice, 
judge, or magistrate judge in the United States); Supreme Court Justices and the Code of Con-
duct, supra note 1 (noting that the same statutory disqualification rules that apply to fed-
eral judges also apply to the Supreme Court). 
128 STATEMENT OF RECUSAL POLICY, supra note 79 (addressing situations where members of 
the Court have relatives at law firms arguing the case in front of the Court); Wheeler, su-
pra note 72 (noting the Court’s history of releasing recusal statements). 
Apr. 2014] SHOULD I STAY OR SHOULD I GO NOW 1215 
 
cedures, and the Court has already exercised this power when pub-
lishing its own guidelines in the past.129  However, if Congress forces a 
code of ethics on the Court and enforces it, then we may run into a 
separation of powers issue.130 
III.  RECUSAL IN TWO COMMON LAW COUNTRIES’ CONSTITUTIONAL 
COURTS 
A.  Recusal in the Supreme Court of Britain 
Because English common law serves as the ancestral backdrop for 
American law, one of the first countries to compare with the United 
States is the United Kingdom.  The recently formed Supreme Court 
of the United Kingdom heads the judicial branch.131  The Supreme 
Court of the United Kingdom was created to end the judicial role of 
the House of Lords and to enhance judicial independence from the 
legislature.132 
The recusal procedure applied in the Supreme Court of the Unit-
ed Kingdom is a creature of tradition.133  Like the United States, a 
party requests a justice to disqualify him or herself and then the jus-
tice decides the motion.  However, a principle of English common 
law is that “nobody may be judge in his own cause.”134  Allowing a jus-
tice to decide whether s/he should recuse undermines this key prin-
ciple.  Moreover, with the adoption of the Human Rights Convention 
in England, some scholars suggest that the court is required to create 
a concrete procedure for recusal.135 
The current standard for recusal is very similar to that of the 
United States Supreme Court.  A justice asks whether a fair-minded 
 
129 See, e.g., STATEMENT OF RECUSAL POLICY, supra note 79. 
130 See supra Part VI (discussing the separation of powers issues inherent in such a proposal). 
131 See generally James Hyre, Comment, The United Kingdom’s Declaration of Judicial Independence:  
Creating a Supreme Court to Secure Individual Rights Under the Human Rights Act of 1998, 73 
FORDHAM L. REV. 423, 426 (2004) (examining the Labour government’s proposal to es-
tablish a Supreme Court of the United Kingdom). 
132 See id. at 428–30 (noting how the House of Lords would have a greater legislative, rather 
than judicial, role with the creation of a Supreme Court). 
133 See Pearson, supra note 12, at 1814–15 (noting the importance of foreign law and prece-
dent on the American courts). 
134 R v. Gough, [1993] A.C. 646 (H.L.) [661] (appeal taken from Eng.). 
135 See Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 10, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948) (“Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public 
hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights and 
obligations and of any criminal charge against him.”); Pearson, supra note 12, at 1822 
(noting that concrete procedure for recusal applications were necessary in the English 
legal system). 
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and informed observer would conclude, having considered the facts, 
that there was a real possibility that the tribunal was biased.136  The 
reasonable observer is an individual who adopts a balanced approach 
to the issue of bias.137  To decide the recusal motion from this view-
point, the justice looks at all the circumstances that have bearing on 
the situation and then asks if a fair-minded and informed observer 
would see a real possibility of bias.138 
The key difference between the United States and the British Su-
preme Court recusal system is that the English system may provide for 
an appeal.  The example is actually a case before the House of Lords, 
because the case arose before the United Kingdom created their new 
Supreme Court.139  This court demonstrated its willingness to analyze 
the bias of one of its own members during Regina v. Bow St. Metro. Sti-
pendiary Magistrate (Ex parte Pinochet Ugarte) (No. 2).140  The former 
head of Chile, General Augusto Pinochet, brought suit to set aside 
the November 25, 1998 House of Lords ruling that Pinochet was not 
entitled to immunity from arrest and extradition.141  Pinochet based 
his suit on the appearance of possible bias resulting from Lord Leon-
ard Hoffmann’s relationship with Amnesty International (“AI”), 
which intervened in the original case.142  Lord Hoffmann’s wife 
worked for AI since 1977, and Lord Hoffmann was a Director and 
Chairperson of Amnesty International Charity Limited (“AICL”).143  
 
136 See Porter v. Magill, [2001] UKHL 67, [2002] 2 A.C. 357 (H.L.) [493] (appeal taken from 
Eng.) (changing the Gough real danger test to the current test for a reasonable possibility 
of bias); see also Pearson, supra note 12, at 1820 (noting the decision to modify the Gough 
test). 
137 See Lawal v. N. Spirit Ltd., [2003] UKHL 35, [2004] 1 All E.R. 187 (H.L.) [192–93] (ap-
peal taken from Eng.) (suggesting that a reasonable apprehension of bias is the proper 
standard). 
138 See id. at 193 (“[The court] must then ask whether those circumstances would lead a fair-
minded and informed observer to conclude that there was a real possibility . . . that the 
tribunal was biased.”). 
139 Hyre, supra note 131, at 423–24 (discussing the Labour government’s 2003 proposal to 
establish the British Supreme Court). 
140 R v. Bow St. Metro. Stipendiary Magistrate (Ex parte Pinochet Ugarte) (No. 2), [2000] 1 
A.C. 119 (H.L.) [125–28] (appeal taken from Eng.) (outlining the allegations that one of 
the members of the Appellate Committee was biased against a party in a proceeding); 
Pearson, supra note 12, at 1820–21 n.145 (discussing how the House of Lords grappled 
with the question of setting aside one of its own appellate decisions because of a bias 
claim). 
141 Ex parte Pinochet Ugarte, 1 A.C. at 125–26; Kate Malleson, Judicial Bias and Disqualification 
after Pinochet (No.2), 63 MOD. L. REV. 119, 119 (2000). 
142 Ex parte Pinochet Ugarte, 1 A.C. at 125–26; Malleson, supra note 141, at 119. 
143 Ex parte Pinochet Ugarte, 1 A.C. at 128–29. 
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As a Director of AICL, Lord Hoffmann neither received payment nor 
participated in the policymaking activities of AI.144 
The issue in the case was whether the House of Lords could set 
aside its prior decision.  Pinochet argued that the House of Lords 
“must have jurisdiction to set aside its own orders where they have 
been improperly made, since there is no other court which could 
correct such impropriety.”145  Lord Nicolas Browne-Wilkinson stated 
that as the ultimate court of appeal, the court has the power to cor-
rect the injustice of an earlier order.146  However, he constrained the 
holding by saying the “House will not reopen any appeal save in cir-
cumstances where, through no fault of a party, he or she has been 
subjected to an unfair procedure.”147  All five Lords148 agreed with 
Lord Browne-Wilkinson and granted Pinochet’s petition.149 
The result of Ex parte Pinochet Ugarte theoretically provides a party 
the right to appeal the judgment of the court if, after the judgment, 
the party discovers facts creating a real potential of bias.  However, Ex 
parte Pinochet Ugarte is unique because Lord Hoffmann’s relationship 
with AI was not part of the public record and was not discovered by 
the party until the trial ended.  Moreover, the case did not review 
Lord Hoffmann’s decision to deny a recusal motion, though it does 
review Lord Hoffmann’s decision not to voluntarily recuse himself.  
However, it is possible that the Supreme Court of the United King-
dom would extend this remedy to allow appeals from denials of 
recusal motions based on the same principles of fairness and impar-
tiality discussed in Ex Parte Pinochet Ugarte. 
Therefore, while the court did not explicitly provide a remedy for 
a denied recusal motion, the logic provided in Ex Parte Pinochet Ugarte 
would support review of a recusal denial as well. 
B.  Recusal in the High Court of Australia 
As another common law country whose roots grow from English 
common law, Australia is another good comparator for the United 
States.  Australia’s constitutional review power is vested in the High 
Court of Australia.150 
 
144 Id. at 131. 
145 Id. 
146 Id. at 132. 
147 Id. 
148 Interestingly, Lord Hoffmann did not participate in this appeal. 
149 Ex parte Pinochet Ugarte, 1 A.C. at 146. 
150 AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION § 71. 
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Like the highest courts in the United States and Britain, the Aus-
tralian High Court has no concrete rule dealing with the procedure 
of recusal motions.151  A party may raise the matter prior to arguments 
through a letter or motion or may raise it by motion or objection dur-
ing arguments.152  The judge whose impartiality is questioned decides 
the motion and responds to the moving party.153 
The Australian court system places independence and impartiality 
as one of its core principles, and its recusal standard flows from this 
ideal.154  Similar to the United States, the Australian standard for 
recusal is whether a fair-minded observer would entertain a reasona-
ble apprehension of bias.155  In the High Court’s view, the reasonable 
person is not a lawyer, but is not ignorant of the legal system, is not 
overly-sensitive, and has the characteristics of the majority of the Aus-
tralian public.156  The Australian High Court explicitly rejected a “real 
danger of bias test,” seeking to avoid requiring litigants to allege ac-
tual bias.157  Alleging actual bias is frowned upon in its legal system 
because it implicitly includes the character of a judge in the recusal 
equation, thereby decreasing public confidence in the Court.158 
As with Britain, the key distinction between Australia and the 
United States is the possibility of an appeal.  In Kartinyeri v. Common-
wealth, Justice Ian Callinan suggested that the denial of a motion for a 
judge to recuse could be appealable.159  The plaintiffs argued Justice 
Callinan should not participate in the case, but did not file a formal 
motion.160  They based their belief on the Justice’s joint opinion re-
garding the Hindmarsh Island Bridge Bill,161 the subject of the case.162  
The plaintiffs argued that a reasonable apprehension of bias existed 
because the Justice’s paper expressed an opinion on the issues before 
 
151 Pearson, supra note 12, at 1823. 
152 Id. 
153 Id. at 1824. 
154 Webb v The Queen [1994] 181 CLR 41, 74 (Austl.) (“[T]he general rationale underlying 
the doctrine is reinforced by the principle expressed in the maxim that nobody may be 
judge in his own cause.”); Andrew Field, Confirming the Parting of Ways:  The Law of Bias 
and the Automatic Disqualification Rule in England and Australia, 2001 SING. J. LEGAL STUDIES 
388, 388–89 (2001) (“Fundamental to the common law system of adversarial trial is that it 
is conducted by an independent and impartial tribunal.”) (citation omitted).  
155 Webb, 181 CLR at 73–74; Field, supra note 154, at 389; Pearson, supra note 12, at 1823. 
156 Pearson, supra note 12, at 1823. 
157 Webb, 181 CLR at 74; Pearson, supra note 12, at 1822–23. 
158 Field, supra note 154, at 393–94. 
159 Id. at 409 n.94; Kartinyeri v Commonwealth (no. 2) [1998] 195 ALJR 1334, 1334–38 (Austl.) 
(statement of Callinan, J.). 
160 Kartinyeri, 72 ALJR at 1334–38. 
161 Hindmarsh Island Bridge Act 1997 (Cth) (Austl.) 
162 Kartinyeri, 72 ALJR at 1334–38. 
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the High Court and a Minister of the Commonwealth, a party to the 
case, requested the paper.163  Justice Callinan refused to recuse, but 
the High Court listed for argument an appeal from this decision.164  
Before the High Court, sitting as a whole, decided the motion, Justice 
Callinan unilaterally withdrew from the case.165 
Therefore, Kartinyeri suggests that it is possible for the full High 
Court to review a single justice’s decision not to recuse.  Moreover, 
Professor Margaret Allars argues that there is “no doubt that the full 
High Court may hear an appeal from a ruling made by a single High 
Court [justice].”166  Additionally, she cites Autodesk Inc. v. Dyason167 and 
De L v. Director-General, NSW Department of Community Services (No. 2)168 
for the proposition that the court has “an inherent power to reopen 
its decision” if procedural fairness requires it.169 
As with the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom, the High 
Court in Australia may eventually provide for review of a denied 
recusal motion.  The court may have already done so, but was unable 
to complete the process due to Justice Callinan’s eventual recusal. 
IV.  RECUSAL IN THREE CIVIL LAW COURTS OF LAST RESORT 
As a means for comparison, it is worthwhile to look at the recusal 
systems of countries that have different legal systems from the United 
States.  This is particularly relevant in the area of recusal because 
many common law countries have recusal procedures and standards 
very similar to that of the United States.170  Therefore, to add a new 
dimension to this Comment’s foreign law analysis, this Part analyzes 
 
163 Id. 
164 Pearson, supra note 12, at 1824–25. 
165 Id. at 1824. 
166 Margaret Allars, Professor, Faculty of Law, The Univ. of Sydney, Perfected judgments and 
inherently angelical administrative decisions:  The powers of courts and administrators to 
reopen or reconsider their decisions, Delivered at the New South Wales Chapter of the 
Australian Institute of Administrative Law and The Administrative Law Section of the 
New South Wales Bar Association Seminar:  The Power of Tribunals to Reconsider Their 
Own Decisions (May 16, 2001),  http://netk.net.au/CrimJustice/Allars.pdf. 
167 Autodesk Inc. v Dyason, [1993] 176 CLR 300 (Austl.) 
168 De L v Dir.-Gen., N.S.W. Dep’t of Cmty. Servs. (No. 2), [1997] 190 CLR 207 (Austl.). 
169 Allars, supra note 166. 
170 See, e.g., Comm. for Justice & Liberty v. Nat’l Energy Bd. (1976), [1978] 1 S.C.R. 369, 394 
(Can.) (reviewing the standard for recusal in the Supreme Court of Canada); Pearson, 
supra note 12, at 1816–17 (describing the recusal system in Canada).  The procedure for 
recusal in the Supreme Court of Canada is the same as the procedure in the United 
States Supreme Court in that a justice decides motions regarding his or her own recusal.  
Id.  Moreover, the recusal standard asks whether a reasonable observer, who is an in-
formed and right-minded member of the community, would have a reasonable appre-
hension of bias.  Id. 
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the recusal process and standards for the court of last resort in three 
civil law countries. 
A.  Recusal in the French Court of Cassation 
The French judicial system is divided into two tracks:  (1) “ordi-
nary courts,” or civil and criminal courts and (2) administrative 
courts.171  The Court of Cassation is the court of last resort for the first 
track.172  The recusal system in this court is found in the statutory law 
of France.173 
The procedure for recusal in the Court of Cassation is very differ-
ent from that of the common law countries’ recusal systems.  A judge 
may informally and voluntarily withdraw from a case when s/he feels 
s/he would have difficulty taking part in the decision.174  The judge 
must explain his or her reasons to the court, which then decides 
whether the judge can recuse.175  If the court agrees with the judge, 
then a new judge is substituted.176 
In addition, a litigant may request that a judge be disqualified for 
enumerated reasons.177  The Court decides whether a judge recuses, 
and the judge whose impartiality is questioned cannot participate in 
the decision.178  Further, the judge must respond to the court for any 
points raised against him or her.179  If the motion is granted, then an-
other judge replaces the one recused.180  If the motion is denied, then 
the party who wrongly raised the issue is fined.181  Moreover, the party 
has a right to appeal the decision of the court, except in specific situ-
ations.182 
 
171 Judicial systems in Member States – France, EUROPEAN JUSTICE, https://e-justice.europa. eu/
content_judicial_systems_in_member_states-16-fr-en.do?member=1 (last updated Dec. 9, 
2013). 
172 Id. 
173 See infra notes 174–89 and accompanying text. 
174 CODE DE PROCÉDURE CIVILE [C.P.C.] art. 339 (Fr.), translated in THE FRENCH CODE OF 
CIVIL PROCEDURE IN ENGLISH 66 (Nicolas Brooke trans., Oxford University Press 2009); 
Jean Pierre Plantard, Judicial Conflicts of Interest in France, 18 AM. J. COMP. L. 710, 713 
(1970) (explaining that a judge may recuse him or herself if certain conflicts of interest 
or other circumstances are present). 
175 Plantard, supra note 174, at 713. 
176 C.P.C. art. 339 (Fr.); Plantard, supra note 174, at 713. 
177 C.P.C. art. 341 (Fr.); Plantard, supra note 174, at 714. 
178 C.P.C. arts. 346, 349, 1027 (Fr.); Plantard, supra note 174, at 714. 
179 C.P.C. arts. 347, 349 (Fr.); Plantard, supra note 174, at 714. 
180 C.P.C. arts. 348, 352 (Fr.); Plantard, supra note 174, at 714. 
181 C.P.C. art. 353 (Fr.); Plantard, supra note 174, at 714. 
182 C.P.C. art. 349 (Fr.) (explaining that the recusal application will be ruled upon by the 
president of the court in question, whose ruling cannot be appealed, if the challenge is 
“directed against a member of a court composed of professional and lay judges” rather 
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Under French law, a judge may recuse him or herself only for 
causes provided for by the law.183  The recusal of a judge may be re-
quested 
(1) Where [s/he] or his [or her] spouse has a personal interest in the 
dispute; (2) Where [s/he] or his [or her] spouse is the creditor, debtor, 
presumed heir or beneficiary of a donation of one of the parties; (3) 
Where [s/he] or his [or her] spouse is related by blood or marriage to 
one of the parties, or to his [or her] spouse up to the fourth degree of 
kinship; (4) Where there have been legal proceedings between himself 
[or herself] or his [or her] spouse and one of the parties or his [or her] 
spouse; (5) Where [s/he] has previously had knowledge of the matter as 
judge or arbitrator or where [s/he] has advised one of the parties; (6) 
Where the judge or his [or her] spouse is entrusted with the administra-
tion of the property of one of the parties; (7) Where there exists a link of 
subordination between the judge or his [or her] spouse and one of the 
parties or his [or her] spouse; [and] (8) Where there has been a well-
known friendship or enmity between the judge and one of the par-
ties. . . .184 
Another ground for removal of judges is renvoi.185  The procedure 
and grounds described above apply to renvoi, but suspicion légitime is 
an additional ground for removal.186  Suspicion légitime exists where 
there are “serious reasons to suspect that all the judges of a Court 
have a common interest in the issue or have some common feeling in 
favor or against one of the parties.”187  However, cases of suspicion 
légitime are extremely rare.188  In fact, there are few cases where con-
flicts of interest are raised.189 
B.  Recusal in the German Federal Constitutional Court 
The German court system is divided into five independent and 
specialized jurisdictions:  (1) ordinary; (2) labor; (3) general admin-
istrative; (4) fiscal; and (5) social.190  In addition to these, there is the 
 
than against a typical judge); Plantard, supra note 174, at 714 (discussing the usual appeal 
right). 
183 C.P.C. art. 341 (Fr.); Plantard, supra note 174, at 713 (“The grounds on which a party can 
ask for the recusation of a judge are various but are restricted by the text of the law.”). 
184 C.P.C. art. 341 (Fr.); Plantard, supra note 174, at 713. 
185 Plantard, supra note 174, at 714. 
186 Id. 
187 Id. 
188 Id. 
189 Id. at 715. 
190 Judicial systems in Member States – Germany, EUROPEAN JUSTICE, https://e-justice.europa.eu/
content_judicial_systems_in_member_states-16-de-en.do?member=1 (last updated Febru-
ary 20, 2013). 
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constitutional jurisdiction of the Federal Constitutional Court.191  This 
court ensures that the government obeys the German Constitution 
and secures the respect and effectiveness of its democracy.192  The 
court consists of sixteen justices, divided into two Senates (or panels), 
which each contain three Chambers.193 
The procedure for recusal allows a litigant to challenge the 
judge’s partiality.194  The panel of the judge in question decides the 
motion without the judge’s participation.195  The challenged judge 
must make a statement on the issue of his or her impartiality.196 
A judge may also self-disqualify by declaring his or her own partial-
ity.197  If s/he does so, the recusing judge’s panel reviews whether the 
statement of self-rejection is reasonable.198  When the court agrees 
that the judge should be removed, a judge from the second panel is 
selected as a substitute.199 
German statutory law provides that a judge from the Federal Con-
stitutional Court must recuse if s/he 
[1] is a party to the case or is or was married to a party, is related by 
blood or marriage in the direct line, related by blood up to the third de-
gree or by marriage up to the second degree in the collateral line[;] or 
[2] has already been involved in the same case by reason of his [or her] 
office or profession.200 
A judge is not a “party” simply because s/he has an interest in the 
outcome based on his or her profession, personal status, political par-
ty, descent, or a general consideration.201  Moreover, a judge is not 
 
191 Id. 
192 The Task, FED. CONSTITUTIONAL COURT, http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/
en/organization/task.html (last visited Mar. 16, 2013). 
193 Organization, FED. CONSTITUTIONAL COURT, http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/
en/organization/organization.html (last visited Mar. 16, 2013). 
194 Gesetz über das Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfGG] [Law on the Federal Constitutional 
Court], Mar. 12, 1951, BUNDESGESETZBLATT, TEIL I [BGBL I] as amended art. 19 (Ger.), 
translated in Federal Constitutional Act (Bundesverfassungsgerichts-Gesetz, BVerfGG) 
(Lawrence Schäfer & Gerhard Dannemann, eds., INTER NATIONES, trans., 2001), 
http://www.iuscomp.org/gla/statutes/BVerfGG.htm; Hans G. Rupp, Judicial Conflicts of 
Interest in the Federal Republic of Germany, 18 AM. J. COMP. L. 716, 722 (1970) (“A judge of 
the Constitutional Court may be rejected by a party who can prove that he has reason to 
suspect bias.”). 
195 BVerfGG, BGBL I, art. 19 (Ger.); Rupp, supra note 194, at 722 (explaining that the judge 
with the potential bias is absent when the question of disqualification is decided). 
196 BVerfGG, BGBL I, art. 19 (Ger.). 
197 BVerfGG, BGBL I, art. 19 (Ger.); Rupp, supra note 194, at 722. 
198 BVerfGG, BGBL I, art. 19 (Ger.). 
199 Id. 
200 Id. at art. 18; Rupp, supra note 194, at 722. 
201 BVerfGG, BGBL I, art. 18 (Ger.); Rupp, supra note 194, at 722. 
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“involved” in a case because s/he participated in legislative proce-
dures or expressed an expert opinion on a relevant question of law.202 
In a case where the federal government provided funds to politi-
cal parties already represented in the Bundestag, the court sustained 
the recusal of a judge based on his public utterances.203  The judge 
was a professor of constitutional law and, while the case was pending, 
read a paper at an academic convention expressing his view that fi-
nancing political parties with government funds was constitutional.204  
Further, he said that it was an “unholy alliance” of liberals who are 
against the government financing of political parties.205  The court 
decided that recusal was appropriate because there were grounds to 
doubt the judge’s impartiality and objectivity.206  The court did not 
require a showing of actual bias.207 
C.  Recusal in the Supreme Court of Japan 
The court system in Japan is similar to the United States with trial 
courts, appellate courts, and a Supreme Court of last resort.208  The 
Japanese Supreme Court is the highest court in the state, exercising 
appellate jurisdiction of final appeal and original jurisdiction in pro-
ceedings against certain government commissioners.209  The court 
consists of a chief justice and fourteen other justices.210  In Japan, 
there are three systems providing for the recusal of justices:  (1) ex-
clusion (Joseki); (2) challenge (Kihi); and (3) withdrawal (Kaihi).211 
The first system of recusal is exclusion, which operates automati-
cally under law.212  A judge is disqualified from performing his/her 
duties 
 
202 BVerfGG, BGBL I, art. 18 (Ger.); Rupp, supra note 194, at 722. 
203 Rupp, supra note 194, at 723–24. 
204 Id. at 723. 
205 Id. at 723–24. 
206 Id. at 724. 
207 Id. (“[T]he Court emphasized that the question to be decided was not whether the judge 
himself felt biased or whether he actually was biased, but whether a party to the case, 
when reasonably evaluating all relevant facts had grounds to doubt his impartiality and 
objectively.”). 
208 Overview of the Judicial System in Japan, SUPREME COURT OF JAPAN, 
http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judicial_sys/overview_of/overview/index.html (last vis-
ited Mar. 17, 2013). 
209 Id. 
210 Id. 
211 Chuichi Suzuki, Problems of Disqualification of Judges in Japan, 18 AM. J. COMP. L. 727, 728 
(1970). 
212 MINJI SOSHŌHŌ [MINSOHŌ] [C. CIV. PRO.] 2011, art. 23 (Japan), translated in 2 EHS LAW 
BULL. SER. no. 2300 (2011); Suzuki, supra note 211, at 728. 
1224 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 16:4 
 
(1) If a judge, [his/her] spouse, or [his/her] former spouse is a party to 
the case, or [s/he] is related to a party in the case . . . ; 
(2) If a judge is or was a  blood relation within the fourth degree of rela-
tionship, a relative by affinity within the third degree of relationship of a 
party, or a relative of a party with whom [s/he] resides; 
(3) If a judge is the guardian, supervisor of guardian, curator, supervisor 
of curator, assistant, or supervisor of assistant of a party; 
(4) If a judge has acted as a witness or expert in the case; 
(5) If a judge is or was the representative  or assistant to party in the case; 
(6) If a judge has participated in an arbitration award in the case or par-
ticipated in a decision of the previous instance against which an appeal 
has been filed.213 
Once the ground for removal is discovered, either the judge may 
exclude him or herself, or the party may file a motion for exclusion.214  
The court makes a disqualification decision if any of the enumerated 
grounds exist.215  If the judge is removed, then the trial starts from the 
beginning, unless a final decision has been made.216 
The second system of recusal is a challenge.  A challenge is au-
thorized “[i]f there are such circumstances as may prejudice the im-
partiality of decision on the part of a judge.”217 
There are some overlaps in the procedure for disqualifications 
and challenges.218  For both, a party may file a motion to the court 
that the judge belongs.219  The challenged judge may express his or 
her opinion on the judgment, but may not participate in the deci-
sion.220  Only an order finding that the disqualification or challenge is 
groundless may be appealed.221  However, in challenges where the 
party took part in preliminary proceedings or oral arguments, the 
party loses the right to challenge, unless the grounds for the chal-
lenge later occurred or were unknown at the time.222 
 
213 MINSOHŌ [C. CIV. PRO.] art. 23; see also Suzuki, supra note 211, at 729 (quoting Article 23 
of The Code of Civil Procedure of Japan). 
214 MINSOHŌ [C. CIV. PRO.] art. 23; Suzuki, supra note 211, at 730. 
215 MINSOHŌ [C. CIV. PRO.] art. 23; Suzuki, supra note 211, at 730. 
216 Suzuki, supra note 211, at 730. 
217 MINSOHŌ [C. CIV. PRO.] art. 24, para. 1; see also Suzuki, supra note 211, at 730 (“The Code 
of Civil Procedure authorizes a challenge ‘if there exist such circumstances concerning a 
judge as are calculated to prejudice the impartiality of decision.” (citation omitted). 
218 See, e.g., MINSOHŌ [C. CIV. PRO.] art. 25, para. 1 (outlining the decision process regarding 
review of either an exclusion or a challenge). 
219 Suzuki, supra note 211, at 733 (“[I]t is clear that the essential functions of exlusion and of 
challenge are identical, since the Code of Civil Procedure prescribes common procedures 
for both, and the Code of Criminal Procedure provides for a motion for exclusion in the 
same terms as for the motion for challenge.”). 
220 MINSOHŌ [C. CIV. PRO.] art. 25, para. 3; Suzuki, supra note 211, at 735. 
221 MINSOHŌ [C. CIV. PRO.] art. 25, paras. 4–5. 
222 Id. art. 24, para. 2; Suzuki, supra note 211, at 732. 
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The final system for recusal is where a judge voluntarily recuses 
him or herself in recognition of a basis for exclusion or challenge.223  
If a judge knew that there were grounds for his or her exclusion or 
challenge, then taking the case would be a waste of judicial economy 
and would jeopardize confidence in the judiciary.224  The judge must 
ask permission from the Court to withdraw.225 
V.  WHAT ARE THE LESSONS FROM THE FOREIGN COURTS? 
The striking differences between the approach to recusal in civil 
and common law countries are very interesting.  From the common 
law countries, there are similarities in the procedure and standard 
applied.  However, at least in England and Australia, there appears to 
be a method to appeal the denial of a recusal motion.  While neither 
have actually granted or ruled directly on an appeal from a recusal 
motion, it would not be surprising if the potential availability of the 
appeal influences public confidence. 
Moreover, the civil law countries provide a very different approach 
to recusal.  In all three, the motion for recusal is decided by the 
court, excluding the questioned judge.  Further, the grounds for 
recusal are clearly enumerated.  While their systems are based on civil 
law, there is much to learn from the method of recusal in these coun-
tries. 
VI.  SUGGEST PROCEDURAL CHANGES TO IMPROVE SUPREME COURT 
RECUSAL 
How can we apply these lessons to the recusal system of the Unit-
ed States?  This Comment suggests incorporating both the approach 
for review provided by the common law countries and the initial deci-
sion procedure of the civil law countries.  The Court should decide to 
either (1) provide meaningful review for the denial of a recusal mo-
tion, while sitting without the questioned Justice; or (2) make the ini-
tial decision as a Court, without the questioned Justice.  Either solu-
tion will increase the perception of impartiality and reinforce the 
public’s perception of the Court. 
 
223 Suzuki, supra note 211, at 736. 
224 Id. at 737. 
225 Id. 
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A.  Decision by Full Court Without the Recused Justice 
While generally not addressed, there seems to be a contradiction 
between the principle that a person shall not judge his or her own 
case and the procedure that allows Justices to decide their own 
recusal.  In the civil law countries discussed, no judge decides his or 
her own recusal motion.226  Even if they voluntarily withdraw, their 
decision is reviewed by the court excluding their participation.227  
These countries conclude that separating the questioned judge from 
the recusal decision is an obvious choice.228 
However, in the United States, a Justice is asked if his or her situa-
tion, as a reasonable observer would see it, could lead to an appre-
hension of bias.  Justice Scalia argued that knowing the facts, that he 
knew, a reasonable observer would not apprehend a bias towards Vice 
President Cheney.229  On the other hand, the facts, as the public 
knows them, led to public outcry and requests for Justice Scalia to 
recuse himself.230  The perception of a Justice, of his or her own be-
havior and relationships, may differ from that of a reasonable observ-
er.  Moreover, an impartial tribunal (the Court sitting without the 
questioned Justice) would be able to determine recusal motions 
without facing this issue. 
Therefore, this Comment suggests that the Court, sitting without 
the Justice in question, decide motions for recusal.  This would pre-
vent the Justice from deciding his or her own perceived bias.  Moreo-
ver, it creates a check on an individual Justice’s power to refuse 
recusal motion when there is no chance for review. 
Nevertheless, there are practical concerns when the full Court is 
made available to hear these appeals.  First, it seems unlikely that the 
Court sitting as a whole will decide to overrule a fellow Justice’s deci-
sion that there is no reasonable perception of partiality, unless there 
is an obvious case of bias.  Second, if the Court decides and writes an 
opinion in these cases, there is a concern of creating at least persua-
sive precedent, if not binding rules.  Third, there is a question of 
whether the appeal will be available as of right or whether the Court 
will allow them on a discretionary basis.  Finally, this process will 
 
226 See supra Part V. 
227 Id. 
228 See, e.g., Plantard, supra note 174, at 714 (“[The judge] cannot, of course, participate in the 
decision . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
229 Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 541 U.S. 913, 923–29 (2004) (Scalia, J., mem.). 
230 See supra note 96. 
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lengthen an already long and expensive process for litigants who have 
gone through the entire appellate system. 
B.  Meaningful Review 
Another complaint made by critics of the recusal system in the 
Supreme Court is the complete lack of review.231  Once a Justice 
makes a decision on a recusal motion, there is no court, judge, or Jus-
tice who can review the decision.  Aside from an example of bad be-
havior sufficient to support impeachment, there is no barrier for ar-
bitrary decisions.232 
The most unique difference between the Supreme Court and the 
courts of last resort in Australia and England is the potential availabil-
ity of review of recusal denials.233  While none of the jurisdictions have 
actually reviewed the recusal denial of a fellow justice before a case is 
decided, at least in England and Australia, there is the possibility that 
review is available.234  Our own Congress attempted to make review 
available through legislation, but failed.235 
Therefore, this Comment suggests that the Court, sitting without 
the Justice in question, be able to review the denials of recusal mo-
tions, particularly when made by the Justice in question.  By provid-
ing meaningful review of recusal motions, the Supreme Court will 
boost the public’s confidence in its integrity. 
The practical concerns of Justice shopping will still apply in this 
situation.  However, there is an added problem where the Court, in 
deciding whether their fellow Justice is biased, may choose not to 
question that Justice’s reasoning, deferring to his or her decision.  
Therefore, the availability of a meaningful review may not make any 
difference in the outcome of recusal motions. 
In addition, there is the possibility that the Court will split on the-
se decisions based on ideological lines.  For example, if the decision 
is highly controversial and there is a split in the Court based on liber-
al and conservative viewpoints, then the liberal Justices will be less in-
clined to recuse another liberal Justice and the conservative Justices 
will be more willing to do so, and vice versa.  This would lead to in-
 
231 See supra Part I. 
232 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
233 See supra Parts III & IV. 
234 Id. 
235 H.R. 862, 112th Cong. § 3(b) (2011). 
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creased politicization of the Court and a decrease in the public’s re-
spect of the Court’s impartiality.236 
C.  Possible Constitutional Issues 
There are also potential constitutional issues with these proposals.  
The Court, deciding to implement these solutions on its own, would 
not violate the Constitution.  However, if Congress steps in and legis-
lates to apply these solutions to the Court, then there may be a sepa-
ration of powers issue. 
To provide for a meaningful review of recusal denials or a process 
whereby the Court sitting without the questioned Justice makes the 
recusal decision, the Court could create its own procedure for ap-
peal.  Reviewing a Justice’s decision does not violate the Constitution, 
as the highest judicial power sits in the Court as a whole.237  An indi-
vidual Justice does not represent the entire Court when s/he makes a 
decision.  Therefore, the Court would still sit above individual Justic-
es. 
Additionally, the Court would still be acting as “one Court” and 
would still maintain its status as the court of last resort, even if it sits 
without one Justice.  Unlike other proposals recommending a panel 
of retired judges and Justices to review recusal denials, using the Su-
preme Court as the reviewing entity avoids violating Article III § 1 of 
the Constitution. 
But, there is a question of whether Congress would violate the 
Constitution by forcing the Court to use either of these procedures.  
The basis for the constitutional violation would be the Separation of 
Powers Doctrine.  By creating three separate branches of government 
in Articles I, II, and III of the Constitution, the Framers created a sys-
tem that “by means of the inevitable friction incident to the distribu-
tion of the governmental powers among three departments, to save 
the people from autocracy.”238  Alexander Hamilton wrote that im-
peachment was the only check on the Judicial Branch because of the 
“necessary independence of the judicial character.”239  Forcing the 
Court to adopt these proposed solutions violates the separation of 
powers if it impermissibly undermines the role of the judicial branch. 
 
236 See Eric Hamilton, Politicizing the Supreme Court, 65 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 35, 36 (2012) 
(“Politicization of the Supreme Court causes the American public to lose faith in the 
Court . . . .”). 
237 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The judicial Power of the United States shall be vested in 
one supreme Court . . . .”). 
238 Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
239 THE FEDERALIST NO. 79, at 472–73 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
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To determine if the proposed solutions undermine the Court’s 
role, one must ask (1) what is the Court’s constitutional role; and (2) 
when is this role impermissibly undermined? 
There is general agreement that the Court’s constitutional role is 
as a decision-maker dealing with cases and controversies, as described 
in Article III of the Constitution.240  However, this decision-maker role 
is also accompanied by the Court’s ability to maintain the necessary 
powers to decide cases and controversies.241  So, the question is 
whether these proposed solutions infringe on this decision-making 
power. 
The level of infringement must be more than de minimis because, 
as Justice Rehnquist said, Congress’s decision to make only nine Jus-
tices “sets limits on [the Court’s] procedure.”242  In his recent paper, 
Professor Brandon Smith analyzed exactly what level of infringement 
is permitted.  He argued that there are certain attributes that are es-
sential to Article III Justices.243  These include the ability to exercise 
the ordinary powers of district courts, such as “subject matter jurisdic-
tion, the ability to decide points of law . . . , and the power to issue 
immediately enforceable judgments.”244 
 
240 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; see, e.g., Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 218–19 
(1995) (discussing the Framers’ intent that the federal courts have power to definitively 
decide cases); William Baude, The Judgment Power, 96 GEO L.J. 1807, 1809 (2008) (stating 
that the power to make binding judgments is part of the judicial role); John Harrison, 
Addition by Subtraction, 92 VA. L. REV. 1853, 1855 (2006) (arguing that deciding cases and 
controversies is the heart of judicial power); Henry Paul Monaghan, Article III and Supra-
national Judicial Review, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 833, 842 (2007) (arguing that the power “to 
say what the law is” as provided by Marbury is the role of the judiciary) (citation omitted); 
Brandon Smith, The Least Televised Branch:  A Separation of Powers Analysis of Legislation to 
Televise the Supreme Court, 97 GEO L.J. 1409, 1421 (2009) (“[T]here is widespread acknowl-
edgement that the Article III ‘judicial power’ is primarily a power of decisionmaking to 
be exercised in the context of cases and controversies.”). 
241 See Access to the Court:  Televising the Supreme Court:  Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Admin. 
Oversight & the Courts of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 13–14 (2011) (statement of 
Maureen Mahoney, Of Counsel, Latham & Watkins LLP, Wash. D.C.) (“[T]he Supreme 
Court has made clear that the judicial power does include the authority to adopt rules 
necessary to conduct its proceedings and to protect the integrity of its decisionmaking 
processes.”). 
242 William H. Rehnquist, The Supreme Court:  How It Was, How It Is (1987), reprinted in SUSAN 
LOW BLOCH & THOMAS G. KRATTENMAKER, SUPREME COURT POLITICS:  THE INSTITUTION 
AND ITS PROCEDURES 383, 387 (1994); see also Smith, supra note 240, at 1423 (discussing 
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s statement and the “parameters . . . affecting judicial 
decisionmaking . . . .”). 
243 See Smith, supra note 240, at 1423–27 (discussing the attributes that are essential to the 
judicial power). 
244 Id. at 1424 (citing N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 84–86 
(1982)). 
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Now, applying this analysis to legislation forcing the recusal of Su-
preme Court Justices either to be decided by the Court sitting with-
out the questioned Justice or to be reviewable by the Court sitting 
without the questioned Justice, there is a de minimus separation of 
powers violation.  As mentioned above, the results of a successful 
recusal motion could certainly affect the outcome of a decision be-
cause the chance of a plurality decision increases.  Further, as Louis J. 
Virelli argues, recusal decisions may be constitutionally reserved to 
the Court and may not be altered by Congress because of policy con-
cerns.245  Virelli contends that Congress would violate the separation 
of powers doctrine by mandating certain recusal standards and pro-
cedures because a recusal decision is an “exercise[ ] of the judicial 
power under Article III that the Justices make individually, inde-
pendently, and without any prospect of review.”246  In a recent 
SCOTUSblog article, Virelli claims, “the Impeachment Clauses of Arti-
cle I and the Exceptions Clause of Article III, as well as the academic 
literature on the inherent power of the federal courts, strongly sug-
gest that Congress is constitutionally precluded from interfering (at 
least substantively) in [recusal] decisions.”247 
On the other hand, this infringement on the Supreme Court’s 
power is clearly offset by its provision of constitutional due process 
rights, namely an impartial Justice, to litigants.248  As the Supreme 
Court has stated, the Due Process Clause provides litigants a 
“right . . . to ‘an impartial and disinterested tribunal.’”249  However, a 
litigant would be denied an impartial tribunal if one of the Justices 
could be reasonably seen as biased.  Moreover, under the current sys-
tem, the Justice deciding a litigant’s recusal motion is clearly interest-
ed in the outcome because the motion directly relates to the Justice’s 
ability to decide a case.  Therefore, the protection of rights guaran-
 
245 Louis J. Virelli III, The (Un)constitutionality of Supreme Court Recusal Standards, 2011 WIS. L. 
REV. 1181, 1230–31 (2011). 
246 Id. at 1231. 
247 Lou Virelli, Scholarship highlight:  Supreme Court recusal and the separation of powers, 
SCOTUSBLOG (Feb. 8, 2013, 12:36 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/02/
scholarship-highlight-supreme-court-recusal-and-the-separation-of-powers/. 
248 U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.  For a good review of this argument, 
see N.Y.C. BAR ASS’N COMM. ON GOV’T ETHICS, SUPREME COURT ETHICS:  THE NEED FOR 
GREATER TRANSPARENCY IN A JUSTICE’S DECISION TO HEAR A CASE 34–35 (2012), 
http://www2.nycbar.org/pdf/report/uploads/20072211-SupremeCourtEthics--
TheNeedforGreaterTransparencyinaRecusal.pdf (“[W]hile the law adds to the ‘only 
check’ on the Court, it protects in part a right guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments.”). 
249 Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 813 (2002) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) 
(quoting Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980)). 
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teed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments may justify the poten-
tial infringement on the Court’s power. 
Additionally, history shows that Congress has a recognized power 
to decide when a Justice should withdraw, as shown through the mul-
tiple statutes dealing with a Justice’s recusal and required disclo-
sures.250  Congress has also passed legislation regarding the number of 
Justices,251 the composition of a quorum,252 the date for the start of 
each term,253 and the limitations on the Court’s subject-matter juris-
diction.254  These examples are particularly fruitful because they are 
procedural mandates like the ones proposed in this Comment. 
In addition to these statutes governing Supreme Court procedure, 
Congress has also created substantive standards to be applied in 
recusal motions through 28 U.S.C. § 455.  Clearly, if such a substan-
tive standard can be forced upon the Supreme Court’s recusal deci-
sions, then creating a procedure for the Justices’ recusal decisions is 
not above-and-beyond prior congressionally defined procedures.255 
Therefore, while it is very likely constitutional for Congress to 
force the Court to undertake these new procedures for recusal, the 
Court should implement these solutions on its own.  The self-
infliction of such a procedural amendment would not only avoid such 
constitutional issues, but would also work in favor of legitimizing the 
Court.  By taking it upon itself to correct the procedural injustices of 
Supreme Court recusal, the Court would acknowledge its concerns 
with the previous system and show the public that the Court is work-
ing to remedy these wrongs. 
CONCLUSION 
From the review of both common law and civil law countries, this 
Comment shows that what our automatic understanding of how 
 
250 See supra Part I.C.2. 
251 28 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). 
252 Id. 
253 28 U.S.C. § 2 (2006). 
254 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1257–59 (2006) (providing that the Supreme Court has jurisdiction 
to review certain cases from the highest state courts, the highest court of Puerto Rico, and 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces); 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (2006) 
(providing over which cases federal courts of appeals have jurisdiction); 28 U.S.C. § 1332 
(2006) (providing which courts have jurisdiction based upon the amount in controversy 
and the citizenship of the parties). 
255 However, Virelli argues that even these prior statutes may be unconstitutional.  See general-
ly Virelli, supra note 247, at 1185 (“This Article . . . argues that any legislative interference 
with Supreme Court recusal decisions is an unconstitutional intrusion into the judicial 
power vested in the Court by Article III of the Constitution.”). 
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recusal should proceed is not necessarily the only one, nor the cor-
rect one.  By looking to foreign courts and thinking about how their 
processes could improve our court system, we are able to learn both 
what our weaknesses are and where our strengths lie.  Clearly, our 
Court is having problems with the recusal system in place.  Without 
reform, the public’s opinion of the Court may continue to decline, 
continuing to diminish the Court’s legitimacy.  Therefore, the need 
to learn from both similar and divergent systems is vital. 
And what do we see?  In the common law countries, there is an 
explicit preeminence of justice and fairness, and the courts of last re-
sort work to ensure that these principles are truly applied.  Where the 
courts see potential partiality, or unfair procedures, they step in to 
correct them. 
Moreover, in the civil law countries, there is a near universal ap-
plication of a very different procedure.  In all three civil law coun-
tries, the judge whose impartiality is questioned does not decide the 
motion for recusal.  The principle that a person should not judge his 
or her own case is embodied in the recusal procedures in these coun-
tries.  Also, the recusal decisions of impartial tribunals are appealable, 
providing even more protection from potentially biased decision-
making. 
It seems surprising that these civil law countries would provide 
more protection than the United States, given our renowned consti-
tutional right to an impartial tribunal.  However, as compared to the 
United States, the other countries examined by this Comment pro-
vide more procedural protections for litigants who fear the decider of 
their case is partial to the other side.  We as a nation should be 
shocked by this and take a hard look at reform. 
This Comment suggests starting with a more protective proce-
dure, rather than focusing on the standard for recusal.  While the 
standard is not set in stone, it is similar to the ones applied in the 
countries this Comment examined.  Therefore, it may be more im-
portant to start with the more troubling procedural issues first, and 
then see if a change in the standard is necessary. 
All in all, what is clear from this analysis is that our recusal system 
needs work, and we can learn how to repair it through the examina-
tion of foreign courts.  Justice and fairness demand it. 
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